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Using a discounted cash flow methodology, we have performed a detailed analysis of the current
costs of electricity from two Indian nuclear reactors. We compare these costs to that from a recently
constructed coal-based thermal power plant of similar size. Our results show that for realistic values
of the discount rate, electricity from coal-based thermal power stations is cheaper than nuclear
energy.
1. Introduction
Nuclear energy has had a long history in India. The
Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948, barely
a few months after the country became independent after
two centuries of British colonialism. A few years later, in
1954 the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was
formed under the direct charge of the Prime Minister,
thereby circumventing many standard procurement and
funding procedures. Ever since its inception, the DAE has
made confident predictions that atomic energy would play
an important role in satisfying India’s energy needs, but
the actual growth of nuclear power in the country has
been extremely modest. In April 2005, the total installed
nuclear power generation capacity was 2,770 MW, less
than 3 % of the total installed electricity generation ca-
pacity of over 115,000 MW in the country[2].
The promise offered by the DAE is not only that nu-
clear power would form an important component of In-
dia’s electricity supply, but that it would be cheap. As
early as 1958, Homi Bhabha, the chief architect of the
programme, projected ‘‘the contribution of atomic energy
to the power production in India during the next 10 to 15
years’’ and concluded that ‘‘the costs of [nuclear] power
[would] compare very favourably with the cost of power
from conventional sources in many areas’’ (emphases
added) [Bhabha and Prasad, 1958]. The ‘‘many areas’’ re-
ferred to regions that were remote from coal-fields. In the
1980s the DAE stated that the cost of nuclear power
‘‘compares quite favourably with coal-fired stations lo-
cated 800 km away from the pithead and in the 1990s
would be even cheaper than coal-fired stations at pithead’’
[Srinivasan, 1985b]. This projection was not realised. A
more recent Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) internal
study comes to the less optimistic conclusion that the
‘‘cost of nuclear electricity generation in India remains
competitive with thermal [electricity] for plants located
about 1,200 km away from coal pit head, when full credit
is given to long term operating cost especially in respect
of fuel prices’’[3].
Despite its inability to live up to its promises, the DAE
has always received high levels of financial support from
the government. In the late 1950s, over a quarter of all
resources devoted to science and technology development
in the country went to the Department of Atomic Energy
[Abraham, 1993]. Though it was subsequently overtaken
by the Department of Space, the total amount spent on
the Department of Atomic Energy, the Defence Research
and Development Organisation, and the Department of
Space has been increasing as a fraction of all government
research and development budgets. In the late 1980s, for
example, the proportion was over 60 % of the total. With
the nuclear weapon tests conducted in 1998, the DAE’s
funding has increased dramatically over the last few years
(see Table 1)[4]. This government support has once again
revived the hopes of the DAE for large-scale expansion;
the DAE envisions having a total installed capacity of
20,000 MW of nuclear power by the year 2020 [Joseph,
1999]. The largest component of this would be in the form
of pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) [Chidam-
baram, 2001][5].
This expected increase in nuclear power capacity, in
particular the focus on PHWRs, makes an assessment of
the economics of electricity generation in these reactors
particularly relevant and urgent. Over a decade ago, a
comparison of energy technologies had concluded that
other options such as coal and hydroelectric power were
cheaper than nuclear power under realistic assumptions
and ‘‘even if the projections and scenarios indicate large
demand-supply gaps in the future, the most expensive way
of bridging these gaps is through nuclear power plants’’
[Reddy et al., 1990].
The major problem in making independent estimates of
the cost of nuclear energy has been the difficulty in get-
ting economic and performance data from the DAE. Like
nuclear establishments elsewhere, the DAE has had a his-
tory of secrecy [Ramana, 2005]. The present study was
undertaken with the hope that over the last decade more
information on the expenditures actually incurred would
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have become publicly available, allowing a better and
more reliable estimate of the costs of electricity generated
in recently constructed and proposed reactors. This hope
has been only partially realized. While the total expendi-
ture on various reactors is available, details about opera-
tional and maintenance expenditure, the cost of producing
heavy water, and so on are not available in the public
domain. Nevertheless, using the available current infor-
mation, and making reasonable assumptions or extrapola-
tions from other countries, we have calculated the
‘‘busbar’’ cost of generating electricity (i.e., not including
transmission and distribution costs) that is delivered to
the grid (i.e., taking auxiliary or in-plant consumption of
electricity into account)[6].
In order to assess the economics of nuclear power, one
has to weigh these costs against the corresponding costs
of generating power through some roughly comparable
technology. For this purpose we follow the DAE’s analy-
ses and choose coal-based thermal power plants, which
constitute 58 % of India’s generation capacity [CEA,
2003]. Like nuclear reactors, these provide base-load elec-
tricity.
2. Methodology
We use the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach that is
widely used in investment analysis [Brealey and Myers,
2000]. This has been applied to earlier studies of the costs
of nuclear power [Reddy et al., 1990], but we have fine-
tuned it for this study by taking into account many of the
sub-processes involved in nuclear power production.
We will express all costs in 2002 (fixed year) rupees.
Our results will therefore be in terms of real discount rates
rather than nominal rates. However, the two are equiva-
lent. To convert costs from one year to another, we use
the ratio of GDP deflators for the respective years as
specified by the World Bank[7]. These are listed for the
22 years from 1981 to 2002 in Table 2.
The cost of generating electricity consists of three main
components: the capital cost of constructing the generat-
ing facility, the annual fuelling and operations and main-
tenance (O&M) costs, which must be incurred as long as
the facility is running, and the waste management ex-
penses from the running of the facility in an environmen-
tally acceptable manner. One other component in the case
of nuclear power is that of decommissioning the reactors.
Though this is an expensive process, its discounted cost
will be small because it is done only many years into the
future. In mathematical terms:
where Cl = capital cost in year l; M = total number of
years of construction before reactors becomes commer-
cial; i = real discount rate; N = number of years of op-
eration; Ok = operations and maintenance (O&M) cost in
year k of operation; Fk = fuel cost in year k of operation;
Wj = waste disposal cost in year j; P = cooling time for
spent fuel; Dq = decommissioning cost in year q; T =
number of years after completion of operations before de-
commissioning is expected to take place. Note that in the
first term on the right-hand side of the equation, all of
the exponents in the denominator are non-positive since
the index runs from --M to 0.
The present value of the revenue generated by selling
electricity is given by
where Ce = levelised cost per kilowatt hour (kWh), and
Ek = energy in kWh generated in year k.
When calculating the price of electricity from a power
plant that is yet to be constructed, it is normal to assume
that annual energy production is constant. It is also as-
sumed that the O&M, fuel, and waste management costs
will increase because of inflation, but are constant in real
terms. Since we will be working in fixed year rupees, they
will be constant in our calculations.
We will find that the results of our analysis depend
sensitively on the discount rate used. There is no consen-
sus on what this rate should be since it is an expression
of how planners wish to allocate resources and how they
value future benefits in comparison with current sacri-
fices. Indian official bodies such as the Central Electricity
Authority (CEA) and the Planning Commission (PC) have
Table 1. Government outlay for DAE (in millions of rupees)
1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006
Budget estimate 18,365.3 26,080.6 29,620.1 27,505.7 27,793.9 38,689.5 38,000.9 44,699.7 49,958.6
Revised budget 19,963.3 24,181.2 26,820.4 27,452.1 27,685.9 33,516.9 37,387.7 42,404.6
Source: Government of India budgets 1998-2005 (Plan + Non-plan expenditure)
Table 2. GDP deflator data for India (base year 1993)
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Deflator 36.1 38.9 42.3 45.5 48.7 52.0 56.8 61.6 66.7 73.7 83.9
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Deflator 91.3 100.0 109.7 119.5 128.2 136.5 147.3 153.0 159.9 165.4 172.0
Source: The World Bank database (available on the Internet to subscribers)
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been using a 12 % discount rate in their calculations for
planning and evaluation of projects [Bose, 2000]. How-
ever, this is a nominal discount rate and translates to a
real discount rate of about 7-6 % at the prevalent 5-6 %
inflation rates. Our calculations will use a real discount
rate, which we vary in order to test the results.
3. Capital costs
The largest component of the cost of producing electricity
in the case of nuclear reactors is the capital cost of the
reactor. Operating costs typically constitute only a small
part of the cost of generating electricity in nuclear reac-
tors. The capital cost consists of the construction cost and
the costs of the initial loading of fuel and heavy water.
Within the DCF methodology, one does not include the
interest during construction (IDC) that is often mentioned
as part of the cost of reactors, since interest results from
the need to borrow money and is not relevant when com-
paring alternative investments[8]. Inclusion of the interest
component would make nuclear power projects more un-
attractive since they are capital-intensive and take longer
to construct; hence, this assumption is favourable to nu-
clear power.
Capital costs can vary considerably. We consider two
specific cases, one set of two reactors already commis-
sioned, and another set being constructed[9]. In the first
case, we use the actual costs of the two 220 MW reactors
at Kaiga Nuclear Power Station (Kaiga I & II) that were
commissioned in 1999. Along with the RAPS III & IV
reactors, these are the newest reactors; thus, one expects
that these would have incorporated the lessons of the
DAE’s experiences with earlier reactors and also be in-
dicative of the future as far as similar reactors are con-
cerned. In the second, we use the projected costs of the
two 220 MW reactors at the same site (Kaiga III & IV)
that are scheduled to be commissioned in December 2006
and 2007.
3.1. Construction costs
The initial cost estimate of Kaiga I & II, which were origi-
nally scheduled to be completed in 1994 [Srinivasan,
1985a, reprinted in Srinivasan, 1990, pp. 127-137], was
Rs. 7.3072 billion [DAE, 1996, p. 67]. However, these
plants became critical only in 1999[10]. At the time of criti-
cality, the cost of the project was estimated at Rs 28.96
billion [DAE, 1996, pg. 67][11]. The year-wise expenditure
on the project is given in Table 3. In our calculations, we
convert the expenditure for each year to 2002 rupees using
the ratio of GDP deflators in Table 2.
One reason for the long delay and cost overrun in the
case of the Kaiga I and II reactors was that the contain-
ment dome -- the structure that is supposed to prevent the
escape of radioactivity into the environment, should an
accident occur -- of one of the units collapsed in May
1994[12]. But all the reactors built by the DAE have had
cost overruns (see Table 4).
Cost increases, though not of such a large magnitude,
have occurred with nuclear reactors in other countries as
well[13]. There is, therefore, the strong likelihood that
capital costs are likely to increase. Despite this, in order
to be favourable to nuclear power in our calculations, we
will use the stated estimated costs for the reactors under
construction.
The financial sanction for Kaiga III and IV, the reactors
being constructed at the same site as Kaiga I and II, is
Rs. 42.13 billion, including an IDC component of Rs. 5.34
billion, or about 12.7 % of the total [DAE, 2002b, p. 94].
Later reports suggest that the NPC expects a shorter ges-
tation time and has lowered the estimated cost to Rs.
32.82 billion [Lal, 2002]. The reduction of the estimated
costs is due not only to lower gestation times but also to
a reduction in the prevailing rates of inflation and interest,
and government concessions given to mega-projects
[DAE, 2002a]. It is not clear how much of the estimated
cost is IDC. In line with the earlier DAE [2002b] estimate,
we will assume that IDC constitutes 12.7 % of the total
cost, or Rs. 4.16 billion.
Plant excavation work for these reactors started in
March 2001 and they are scheduled to become critical in
2006 and 2007 respectively [NPC, 2004a]. However, ad-
vance procurement for these reactors began as early as
1990-91 [DAE, 1991, p. 1.4]. Up to March 2000, Rs.
3.9405 billion had been spent on the project [DAE, 2002b,
p. 94]. Once again, we assume that 12.7 % of this con-
stitutes IDC. We also assume that the expenditure was
uniform over these years. For the remaining period and
amount we assume a different pattern of annual expendi-
ture, shown in Table 5, expecting shorter construction
times. This follows the pattern of expenditure for Cana-
dian PHWRs [NEA, 1998, p. 60].
3.2. Heavy water inventory costs
Heavy water (HW) reactors, as the name suggests, require
heavy water -- water with the hydrogen replaced by deu-
terium, a heavier isotope of hydrogen (atomic weight 2).
The HW is used both as moderator (to slow down neu-
trons emitted during fission so that they have a higher
probability of being captured by other fissile nuclei) and
as coolant (to carry away the heat produced).
The initial coolant and moderator inventory require-
ments for each 220 MW PHWR are 70 and 140 tonnes
(t) of HW respectively [NEI, 1994]. The NPC reportedly
treats the initial HW requirements as a non-depreciating
asset and calculates lease charges at 8 % per annum to
be paid to the DAE [Muralidharan, 1988]. Within the DCF
methodology, the correct way to include the cost is to
treat the initial HW inventory as an up-front capital cost.
However, at the end of the economic lifetime of the re-
actor when the (‘‘leased’’) HW is returned to the DAE,
there is a cash inflow, which must be discounted to the
time of commissioning.
There are practically no public figures available for the
amount of HW produced in the DAE’s heavy water plants
(HWPs). The DAE annual performance budgets list, for
example, the annual electricity production at various re-
actors; however, they conspicuously avoid giving any
numbers for HW production. In the past, the DAE has
claimed that because of its strategic value, it would not
disclose the production levels.
What little information is available is suggestive of
 Energy for Sustainable Development l Volume IX No. 2 l June 2005
Articles
37
poor performance. In 1992, The Times of India reported
that only 273 t of HW were produced in all the HWPs
put together [Fernandez, 1992], implying an average ca-
pacity factor of about 50 %. The Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) of India’s report for 1988 said the ‘‘Tuti-
corin [heavy water] plant produced 20.6 % of the installed
capacity in the last eight years’’ (i.e., between July 1978
and March 1986). The best production was 42.7 % of the
design capacity. The plant has ‘‘been able to operate on
an average for about 150 days ... per annum’’ and ‘‘the
consumption of spares and maintenance cost was high and
Rs. 190 lakhs [19 million] had been spent per annum on
an average’’ [CAG, 1988].
The performance of HWPs appears to have improved;
in 1998, 100 t of HW were exported to South Korea
[Anon., 1997][14]. In part, this surplus availability of HW
is because the expected growth in nuclear power did not
take place. Even in recent years, however, a number of
plants have had prolonged outages. The Talcher plant, in
particular, has been suspended for many years since the
associated fertilizer plant has not been operating satisfac-
torily [DAE, 2000, pp. 24-25]. Similarly, during 2002-03
the plant at Tuticorin was affected by frequent outages of
the connected fertiliser plant [DAE, 2003, p. 5]. The Thal
plant had extended outages in 1998-99, whereas the Hazira
and Kota plants had prolonged outages in 1997-98 [DAE,
2000, p. 24; DAE, 1999, p. 20]. Consequently in both
years, the total production target for HW was not met.
The cost of HW produced in the DAE’s plants has been
a matter of dispute. For example, in 1983 the AEC quoted
a price of Rs. 3,875/kg whereas the CAG calculated that
it should be Rs. 13,800/kg [Reddy, 1990]. Since these es-
timates relied on the earlier plants, and newer plants ap-
pear to be performing better, we look at the case of the
Table 3. Expenditure pattern (without IDC) for construction of Kaiga I & II
Year 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92
Base cost (Rs. million) 34.5 79.5 153.3 265.2 144.2 353.1 651.2 1186.2 1495.3
Year 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01
Base cost (Rs. million) 1377.6 2078.3 1866.0 1850.5 1718.7 1348.3 1139.6 1778.5 640.1
Source: DAE, 2002b
Nlote
1. At the current exchange rate, US$ 1 is about Rs. 44.
Table 4. Capital costs of operating reactors
Station Capacity (MW) Original cost
(Rs, million)
Revised cost
(Rs. million)
Criticality year
TAPS I & II 2 ´ 160 929.9 - 1969
RAPS I 1 ´ 100[1] 339.5 732.7 1972
RAPS II 1 ´ 200 581.6 1025.4 1980
MAPS I 1 ´ 220 617.8 1188.3 1983
MAPS II 1 ´ 220 706.3 1270.4 1985
NAPS I & II 2 ´ 220 2098.9 7450[2] 1989 & 1991
Kakrapar I & II 2 ´ 220 3825 13,350 1992 & 1995
Kaiga I & II 2 ´ 220 7307.2 28,960 1999 & 2000
RAPS III & IV 2 ´ 220 7115.7 25,110 2000
Sources: DAE, 1996, p. 67; DAE, 2002b
Notes
1. This was derated from 200 MW.
2. The revised cost estimates for NAPS, Kakrapar & Kaiga include interest during construction.
Table 5. Expenditure pattern assumed for Kaiga III and IV
Year (Y0 = commissioning year) Y0-5 Y0-4 Y0-3 Y0-2 Y0-1 Y0
Fraction spent (%) 1.9 9.7 20.2 30.9 27.3 10
Source: [NEA, 1998]
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most recently commissioned HWP at Manuguru.
Sanctioned in 1982, the Manuguru HWP has an annual
capacity of 185 t of HW. The estimated cost of the
Manuguru HWP when it was sanctioned was Rs. 4.216
billion. In 1989, the plant cost was revised to Rs. 6.6158
billion. The plant finally started production in December
1991 [CAG, 1994]. According to the CAG, the ‘‘total capi-
tal cost including interest during construction and exclud-
ing cost of spares came to Rs. 983.38 crores [9.8338
billion] and the increase, with reference to the original
estimated cost ... was ... 133 percent.’’ When questioned
about the cost escalation, DAE stated that ‘‘the grounds
for sanction of this project was strategic and not commer-
cial’’.
The DAE’s initial estimate of the cost of production
was Rs. 5,176 per kg of HW (Rs./kgHW). However, be-
cause of slippages in the project schedules and consequen-
tial delay in commencement of production, the cost of
HW worked out to Rs. 7,529/kgHW as of February 1986
[CAG, 1994]. This translates to about Rs. 24,880/kgHW
at 2002 prices, in the same ball-park as the 1983 figure
of Rs. 6,635/kgHW (Rs. 26,960/kgHW when inflated to
2002 prices) cited by the then head of the DAE [Ramanna,
1985]. However, in its 1994 report on Manuguru, the
CAG pointed out ‘‘Due to further escalation, the cost
would have gone up further -- the figures for costing after
commencement of production in December 1991 were not
produced to Audit (December 1993).’’ There appear to be
no further public estimates of the cost of the project. In
line with our attempts to be favourable to nuclear power
in our estimates, we will use the figure of Rs.
24,880/kgHW.
One can understand the rather high cost of HW from
not only the high capital costs but also the extreme energy
intensity of the processes involved in producing it. There-
fore, over the last few years, the DAE has been trying to
implement energy efficiency measures. According to the
DAE, during the period 2001-2002, energy consumption
was reduced by about 6 %, thereby effecting savings of
around Rs. 850 million [Anon., 2002][15]. Therefore, the
total energy consumption bill was Rs. 14.1667 billion. Ex-
cluding the Talcher plant where operations have been sus-
pended, the total production capacity of all HW plants at
that time was about 490 t/annum. Even assuming an op-
timistic 80 % capacity factor, the energy cost of produc-
ing one unit of heavy water is Rs. 18,070/kgHW.
Therefore, a total cost of Rs. 24,880/kgHW is quite plau-
sible.
When calculating the cost of the initial loading of HW,
one small but pertinent detail is that there is usually a
period of about 6 months or more between the reactor
becoming critical and starting commercial operations. For
example, Kaiga II became critical on September 24, 1999
but started operating commercially only on March 16,
2000 [Anon., 1999b; NPC, 2004b]. The reactor is loaded
with fuel and HW well before criticality. We shall assume
that the total time between loading with HW and uranium
and the reactor producing electricity commercially is 6
months. Therefore, just as there is a credit for the HW
returned at the end of the reactor life, there will be an
additional component in the initial capital cost.
3.3. Uranium fuel inventory
Another component of expenditure in setting up a nuclear
reactor is the initial uranium loading. A 220 MW reactor
uses 3,672 fuel assemblies, each containing 15.2 kg of
uranium oxide. The cost of each assembly is reported to
be Rs. 250,000 [Subramanian, 2002b][16]. This translates
to Rs. 16,450/kg of uranium fuel. This is comparable to,
but less than, the 1983 price of Rs. 4,545 per kg of ura-
nium fuel cited by the then head of the DAE, when trans-
lated to 2002 rupees [Ramanna, 1985].
The NPC obtains its fuel from the Nuclear Fuel Com-
plex. Rather than pay the production costs plus a reason-
able rate of return, the fuel is reportedly ‘‘hired’’ at an
administrative price set by the DAE [Wood, 1991]. How-
ever, the true cost of nuclear electricity must include this
cost. A 1985 paper by the DAE suggests that 50 % of the
cost of initial uranium fuel-loading is already included in
the capital cost estimates [Srinivasan, 1985a, reprinted in
Srinivasan, 1990, pp. 127-137]. Even assuming this to be
true, within the DCF methodology we have used, the re-
maining 50 % of the cost has to be included as part of
the initial capital costs. Again, because of the assumed
six-month period between fuel-loading and the commer-
cial delivery of electricity, there is an additional compo-
nent to the fuel cost.
We shall also assume that the nuclear plant stores about
1.5 months worth of uranium (at the assumed capacity
factor) and HW (to account for expected losses) and in-
corporate this as a capital cost[17].
3.4. Decommissioning costs
Within the DCF methodology, the cost of decommission-
ing a reactor, which is done at the end of its economic
life and a long period of cooling, which we assume to be
40 years, should be incorporated as a capital expense.
While there is little experience with actually decommis-
sioning nuclear reactors and how much it costs, agencies
that promote nuclear energy typically assume that decom-
missioning would cost between 9-15 % of the initial capi-
tal cost of a nuclear power plant [UIC, 2001]. There are
other estimates. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
estimates the cost of decommissioning nuclear reactors to
be about $ 300-450 million [NRC, 2004]. Since the typi-
cal US nuclear reactor costs about $ 1,500/kW and has a
capacity of 1,000 MW, this is equivalent to 20-30 % of
capital costs or $ 300-450 per kW. On the higher side,
decommissioning the 1,240 MW Superphenix is estimated
to cost $ 4,000 per kW.
Though based on some limited experience, the numbers
cited above are only estimates. Actual experiences have
often been significantly more expensive. Decommission-
ing the 100 MW Niederaibach HW reactor cost $ 1,910
per kW while the 45 MW Japan Power Demonstration
boiling water reactor cost $ 3,180 per kW [WISE, 1998].
Nevertheless, in order to be favourable to nuclear
power in our estimates, we will assume that decommis-
sioning expenses are 10 % of the initial capital cost. De-
commissioning is usually divided into three stages
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[Saddington, 1983]. In rough correspondence with these
stages, we assume that 40 % of the decommissioning ex-
penses occur when the reactor is shut down at the end of
its economic life, another 20 % at 20 years following
shutdown, and the remaining 40 %, 40 years after shut-
down.
As mentioned earlier, there is no consensus on what
discount rate should be chosen for calculations of eco-
nomics of electricity generation. This debate is most in-
tense when it comes to costs that are borne by future
generations[18]. Choosing a high discount rate would mean
that future expenditures are given very little weight in
economic calculations. Some economists have proposed
that in the interests of inter-generational equity, such ac-
tivities should be valued at a zero or a very low discount
rate [Howarth and Norgaard, 1993]. One suggested ap-
proach is to use two discount rates, one for the near-term
expenditures and one for long-term expenditures. For ex-
ample, the Charpin report on the future of nuclear energy
in France chooses a 6 % discount rate for expenses in the
first 30 years and a 3 % discount rate for expenditures
thereafter [Charpin et al., 2000]. Decommissioning ex-
penses would fall in the latter category. For simplicity and
in order to be favourable to nuclear power, we choose the
same discount rate for all expenditures, which, as men-
tioned earlier, is varied in our calculations.
4. Recurring costs
4.1. Fuel-loading costs
The amount of fuel needed to produce a unit of electric
power is given by the formula:
The thermal efficiency is the electricity generated per
unit thermal power output. The burn-up is the heat liber-
ated per unit mass of fuel irradiated; it depends on the
reactor type, the fuel used (level of uranium enrichment),
and fuelling practices. In the case of the PHWRs we are
considering, the average burn-up is 7,000 MWD/tU
(megawatt-day per tonne of Uranium) [Hibbs, 1997a;
Changrani et al., 1998]. The thermal efficiency for
PHWRs is taken to be the design efficiency of 0.29
[Balakrishnan, 1999]. In terms of gross generation, the
uranium utilisation is 20.5 mg/kWh (milligram per kilo-
watt-hour).
4.2. Heavy water make-up costs
There are also routine losses of heavy water in PHWRs.
This is due to many reasons. For example, during the in-
itial years at the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, there
were several failures involving heat-exchangers [Ghosh,
1996]. These have HW on one side and cooling water on
the other. Thus, when they fail, the HW could get mixed
with cooling water and escape. There have also been a
number of HW leaks and spills -- just in 1997, such leaks
occurred at the Kakrapar I, MAPS II and Narora II reac-
tors [IAEA, 1998, pp. 301-320]. Such leaks could occur
because of various causes. For example, on 15 April 2000,
vibration caused the failure of a gasket in the moderator
system piping of the Narora II reactor and 7 tonnes of
HW leaked out [AERB, 2001, p. 13].
Typically some of the HW that is spilt or has otherwise
escaped is collected, purified and reused but the rest is
discharged into the atmosphere. This creates a radiation
hazard to workers and potentially the general public be-
cause of the build-up of tritium (the isotope of hydrogen
with atomic weight 3) in the HW [Ramana, 1999)[19].
In the early years of RAPS-I operations, routine escape
and losses were fairly high (Table 6). These have since
reduced. In the eighties, the DAE estimated that the an-
nual HW make-up requirement for two 235 MW reactors
(subsequently de-rated to 220 MW) was 16 t/year
[Ramanna, 1985]. More recently, the first Managing Di-
rector of the Nuclear Power Corporation stated that the
annual make-up of HW in a 220 MW reactor is 7 t/year
[Kati, 2003, p. 39]. Another report mentions that average
HW losses for the Kakrapar reactors were ‘‘between 500
and 600 kg/month’’, or about 6 to 7.2 t/year [Hibbs,
1997b]. We shall assume that each 220 MW reactor loses
7 t/year.
4.3. Operations and maintenance (O&M) cost
Operating and maintaining a nuclear power plant involves
a number of expenses including paying the many trained
professionals needed to run the plant, materials for main-
tenance, site monitoring, operating waste management fa-
cilities, collecting and purifying heavy water that escapes,
and so on. Once again there is little data available pub-
licly. We shall assume that this is 2 % of the capital cost.
4.4. Waste management
The problem of dealing with radioactive nuclear wastes
has been one of the most contentious aspects of nuclear
power programmes around the world [NEA, 1996; Berk-
hout, 1991]. Since some of these wastes are extremely
long-lived, their generation represents a burden to future
generations who will not utilize the electricity produced
in these nuclear reactors but may have to undertake meas-
ures to ensure that these radioactive materials do not enter
their food chain, water resources, and so on. Any attempt
at quantifying the costs involved is bound to have enor-
mous uncertainties. Nevertheless, the approach used by
nuclear power advocates has been to use the cost of set-
ting up a structure that is expected to contain the radio-
active materials within it for a long period of time as the
cost of waste management. Despite the controversies in-
volved, we shall follow this approach.
Table 6. RAPS-I heavy water escape and losses
Year Escape
(kg/day)
Loss
(kg/day)
Annual loss
(t)
1972 135 31 11.3
1973 197 69 25.2
1974 249 57 20.8
1975 386 77 28.1
Source: [Srinivasan, 1990, p. 24].
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Most of the radioactivity generated is contained in the
spent fuel, i.e., fuel after irradiation in nuclear reactors.
Besides this, large quantities of low-level solid and liquid
wastes are also produced during reactor operation and
maintenance[20]. These are largely treated on-site and we
shall assume that the expenses incurred therein are in-
cluded in the O&M costs.
Countries around the world have adopted one of two
approaches to deal with the highly radioactive spent fuel.
In the first, the spent fuel is ‘‘directly disposed of’’ by
first keeping it in intermediate storage and eventually stor-
ing it in geological repositories. The other approach is to
‘‘reprocess’’ the spent fuel to extract plutonium and the
unused uranium, and concentrate the most highly radio-
active components in the spent fuel into liquid ‘‘high-level
waste’’. Though controversies remain, it is generally ac-
cepted that direct disposal is the cheaper method of deal-
ing with nuclear wastes at current uranium prices on the
international market [Berkhout, 1997; NEA, 1994; Bunn
et al., 2003]. At current uranium prices, Bunn et al. [2003]
estimate that reprocessing adds ‘‘more than an 80 % in-
crease in the costs attributable to spent fuel management
(after taking account of appropriate credits or charges for
recovered plutonium and uranium from reprocessing)’’
and the difference in costs ‘‘is likely to persist for many
decades.’’
The DAE has adopted the more expensive route of re-
processing to deal with spent fuel. The rationale offered
for this choice has been the three-stage programme envi-
sioned by the DAE. The first stage involves the use of
uranium fuel in PHWRs, the second stage involves fast
breeder reactors that use plutonium from reprocessed
spent fuel from PHWRs and thorium to produce uranium-
233, and the third stage involves reactors using uranium-
233 and thorium [Kakodkar, 2000]. Since the second stage
of the programme requires plutonium, reprocessing is
needed to proceed with this programme. This requirement
is used by the NPC to neglect the cost of waste disposal
from PHWRs. In the NPC’s analysis of the economics of
PHWRs, ‘‘the cost of waste disposal has been assumed to
have trade off with the amount of reprocessed fuel gen-
erated for next stage of nuclear power programme’’
[Nema, 1999].
Even if one were to follow the NPC’s logic and assume
that the hugely expensive infrastructure needed for reproc-
essing is a part of the second stage of the nuclear power
programme, there is still the cost involved in dealing with
the spent fuel before reprocessing. Because the spent fuel
as it comes out of the reactor is highly radioactive and
produces a lot of heat, it is initially kept under water for
cooling. In India, this is done for a minimum of 430 days
[Changrani et al., 1998]. In practice it may be more, even
up to 5 to 10 years, which would increase the waste man-
agement costs at the nuclear power plant [Srinivasan,
1995]. Then it has to be shipped to the reprocessing
plant[21]. Once again because of the high radiation levels
(even after cooling), spent fuel shipping containers must
be heavily shielded, and must be designed to stringent
safety standards. For these reasons the cost of spent fuel
shipping is not an insignificant component of the fuel cy-
cle cost [Graves, 1979, p. 261]. The OECD’s Nuclear En-
ergy Agency quotes a price of $ 13/kg (1991 US dollars)
for transporting spent fuel from PHWRs [NEA, 1994, p.
78]. Converting this to 2002 rupees, this is equivalent to
Rs. 878/kg of spent fuel.
To estimate the cost of waste management, we shall
assume that the spent fuel is simply handed over to the
reprocessing plant and the only cost incurred as part of
the fuel cycle of the PHWR is the cost of transportation.
This assumption is favourable to nuclear power when cal-
culating the electricity price from PHWRs. A fairer evalu-
ation would attribute at least part of the reprocessing
expenditures to the electricity generation costs at PHWRs.
Preliminary estimates of the cost involved in reprocessing
indicate that it is in the range of Rs. 10,000-20,000/kg of
spent fuel depending on the efficiency of the plant
[Ramana and Suchitra, forthcoming].
5. Performance
The cost of electricity depends on the efficiency, measured
in terms of load factor or capacity factor, with which the
generation facility operates. For long, the DAE’s reactors
were among the poorest performers in the world. In De-
cember 1994 Nuclear Engineering International, a stand-
ard trade journal, found that the average lifetime load
factor for Indian reactors was 36.08 %, the lowest among
the 18 countries with four or more nuclear reactors; only
Brazil, with just one reactor, fared worse [Howles, 1995].
Four years later, this position was unchanged, with the
lifetime average load factor still the lowest [Anon.,
1999c]. However, the performance of the NPC’s reactors
has been improving over the last few years. This suggests
that the NPC is over its teething problems. But it also
reflects the recent dramatic increases in funding for the
DAE (Table 1). Further, at the level of individual reactors,
performance has remained erratic. For example, in 2002-
2003, the Kakrapar-I reactor had a record 98 % capacity
factor, but it decreased to 78 % in 2003-2004, and has
deteriorated further in 2004-2005 [NPC, 2004c].
This improved performance of nuclear reactors must be
balanced with two factors. The first is the fact that similar
improvements in performance have also been noted in
many other sources of power. The second is that with the
commissioning of several reactors over the past few years
-- more than half of the currently installed capacity was
commissioned during the 1990s -- the average age of the
reactor units is low. As these age, one would expect to
see a deterioration of performance as well as increased
costs to keep them running.
It is instructive, therefore, to look at the average life-
time load factors of the DAE’s PHWRs (listed in Table
7). The average of these is 65.1 %. To accommodate the
possibility of improved performance and to be favourable
to nuclear power, we shall assume a capacity factor of
80 % as the base figure in our calculations. Such a high
capacity factor partially offsets the capital-intensive na-
ture of nuclear power.
Another aspect of plant performance is the amount of
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electricity consumed by the power plant itself. The official
in-plant consumption for all electricity-generating plants
is 7-8 % [NTPC, 2004; CSO, 1999]. However, looking at
actual figures for gross generation and net exports at the
DAE’s nuclear reactors, the in-plant consumption figures
are 13.4 %, 12.4 %, 11.5 %, 11.3 %, 12 %, 11.7 %, and
11.9 % for the years 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98,
1998-99, 1999-2000, and 2000-01 respectively [DAE,
1997, p. 10; DAE, 1998, p. 14; DAE, 1999, p. 12; DAE,
2000, p. 13; DAE, 2002b, p. 27]. We shall, therefore, as-
sume 12 % for the in-plant consumption in the case of
the Kaiga reactors.
6. Costs of coal power
For calculating the cost of producing electricity from coal,
we chose the case of the Raichur VII Thermal Power Sta-
tion (RTPS VII). Like the Kaiga I and II reactors, RTPS
VII is also a relatively recent plant. It has a capacity of
210 MW, roughly the same as each of the Kaiga reactors,
and is an example of multiple projects at the same location
(just as Kaiga III and IV are co-located with Kaiga I and
II). Being in the same geographical region, it feeds into
the same grid and therefore faces roughly similar prob-
lems from grid instabilities.
The RTPS VII project was sanctioned on March 4, 1999
and the plant was synchronised to the grid on December
10, 2002; till March 2003, the total expenditure (not in-
cluding IDC) came to Rs. 4.9133 billion [CEA, 2004a][22].
The annual expenditures during the four years 1999, 2000,
2001, and 2002 are assumed to be 10 %, 40 %, 40 %,
and 10 % of the total. As with nuclear plants, we shall
assume that the plant stores about 1.5 months’ supply of
coal and furnace oil and incorporate this into the capital
cost.
O&M expenses at thermal plants are usually set at
2.5 % of the capital cost and we shall follow that practice
[Mahalingam, 2001]. On the basis of actual generation
data at the Raichur units [CEA, 2002], we use an auxiliary
consumption rate of 8.5 %. We shall assume that the
RTPS VII station has an economic lifetime of 30 years
(as opposed to 40 years for the Kaiga reactors).
The main expense in producing electricity from thermal
power stations is the fuel. The fuel cost depends on the
amount of coal used to generate one unit of power. At the
other Raichur stations (RTPS I to VI), the coal consump-
tion for 2001-02 was 0.63 kg/kWh [CEA, 2002]. We as-
sume the same consumption rate for RTPS VII.
The two primary qualities of coal that are of interest
to thermal power plants are the calorific (energy) content
and the proportion of ash. Inferior grade varieties of coal
have lower calorific content and higher ash content. Since
the quality of coal used varies from plant to plant and
over time, we follow the Expert Committee on Fuels for
Power Generation (ECFPG) and assume a standardized
coal grade with calorific content of 3,750 kCal/kg [CEA,
2004b] (or about 15.7 MJ/kg). The basic cost of this grade
of coal at the pithead including taxes, duties and royalty
is estimated by the ECFPG to be Rs. 517/t; the distance
from Raichur to the coal-producing regions of Eastern In-
dia is about 1200 km and the cost of freight for distances
above 1,200 but below 1,500 km is Rs. 894.9/t [CEA,
2004b][23]. Thus, the effective cost of domestic coal at the
Raichur plant works out to be about Rs. 1,412/t.
The corresponding cost for imported coal with calorific
content of 22.6 MJ/kg at the port is about Rs. 1,925/t; the
distance from Raichur to Mangalore port is about 450 km
and the cost of freight for distances between 300 and 500
km is Rs. 251/t. Thus the effective cost of imported coal
at the Raichur plant works out to about Rs. 2,175/t. With
these figures, the levelised cost of electricity using im-
ported coal is about Rs. 0.03/kWh higher than when using
domestic coal.
Thermal plants also use furnace oil, whose consumption
at the Raichur plant is about 2 ml/kWh. Its price is about
Rs. 18 per litre (l) [NTPC, 2005].
All these prices are, of course, subject to market fluc-
tuations and standard inflationary increases. In principle,
the price of uranium would also be subject to similar
changes[24]. We shall ignore the fluctuations since these
should get averaged over the long lifetime of the plant.
The inflationary increases are implicitly taken into con-
sideration by working in fixed-year rupees.
Just as we included the cost of waste disposal in the
case of nuclear power, here we include the cost of disposal
of ash. Typical ash content in Indian coal is about 40 %,
of which about 80 % is fly ash and the remaining 20 %
is bottom ash [CPCB, 2000]. In 1999, the Ministry of
Environment and Forests stipulated that all coal thermal
power plants should utilize the fly ash generated for
manufacturing bricks, road-laying, making embankments,
in land-fills, and so on. The same notification also ordered
brick manufacturers, public works departments, the Na-
tional Highway Authority, and other agencies to use ash
generated in coal plants. The ash is, at least initially, to
Table 7. PHWR load factors till 2003
Station Cumulative load factor
(%)
RAPS I 23.31
RAPS II 52.65
MAPS I 52.82
MAPS II 52.92
NAPS I 60.62
NAPS II 67.82
Kakrapar I 70.91
Kakrapar II 84.14
Kaiga I 80.70
Kaiga II 80.91
RAPS III 77.98
RAPS IV 79.20
Source: PRIS (Power Reactor Information System) Database, International Atomic Energy
Agency, available on the Internet at http://www.iaea.org
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be provided free of cost. However, there are definite sav-
ings for the end-users in terms of reduced requirements
for various inputs[25].
In the case of the Raichur thermal plant, the fly ash
generated is used for the manufacture of portland poz-
zolona cement (PPC) by the Associated Cement Compa-
nies Ltd., which has exclusive rights to collect fly ash
free from three of the seven plants at that site
[Giriprakash, 2001]. The use of fly ash for PPC manu-
facture lowers the costs of cement production because of
reduced requirements for thermal and electrical energy,
and lower consumption of clinker. Therefore in general
PPC manufacturers have been willing to pay the costs of
transporting the fly ash from thermal plants [Shah, 1999].
In some cases, they have even been willing to purchase
the fly ash.
Rather than assuming the above, we chose to assume
that the thermal plant internalizes the cost of disposing
of the ash. To do this, we followed [Bhattacharjee and
Kandpal, 2002a] and estimated the cost of using fly ash
for brick manufacture. Using these numbers, and assum-
ing the same figures for bottom ash as well, we estimate
an ash disposal cost of not more than Rs. 174/t (Table 8).
At Rs. 174/t of ash, the disposal cost for coal with 40 %
ash content is Rs. 0.05/kWh. It should be emphasized that
this is costlier than current practice because it assumes
that the power plant bears the cost for a more environ-
mentally benign way of disposing of waste. This is also
more expensive than using the ash for cement manufac-
ture. However, in order to be favourable to nuclear power,
we use this figure.
7. Results and comparison
We now compare the costs of nuclear power from the
Kaiga I/II and Kaiga III/IV reactors and the cost of ther-
mal electricity from RTPS VII using domestic coal. Table
9 summarizes the figures used in our calculations.
As mentioned earlier, the cost of electricity is calculated
as a function of discount rate. We begin with the com-
parison for a (real) discount rate of 1 %. As seen in Table
10, the levelised cost of electricity from nuclear reactors
is lower than the case of RTPS VII (using domestic coal).
The cost of nuclear power is dominated by the capicity
cost whereas that of thermal power is dominated by the
fuel cost.
Since only the capacity cost varies with discount rate,
for other values of the discount rate we only list the total
levelised cost. These are listed in Table 11 and shown
graphically in Figure 1. The last row in Table 11 lists
levelised costs for a real discount rate of 6 %, which, as
mentioned earlier, roughly corresponds to the discount
rate assumed by the Planning Commission (PC) and the
Central Electricity Authority (CEA).
The exact value of the discount rate (i.e., the crossover
point) at which the cost of thermal power becomes
cheaper than nuclear power from Kaiga I and II stations
is about 2.33 % (levelised cost of Rs. 1.366). While there
is debate on the appropriate discount rate for public in-
vestments, few would argue that 2.33 % is a high rate for
long-term investments, especially in a country with mul-
tiple demands for capital. The crossover point determined
by Reddy [1990] varied from 5 to 7.5 % (nominal dis-
count rate).
As mentioned earlier, the utilisation of a power plant
(expressed through the capacity factor) is a determinant
of the price of electricity generated. Since nuclear power
is capital-intensive, lower capacity factors would reduce
its competitiveness. This is demonstrated in Table 12
which lists the crossover point in discount rates for three
different capacity factors. If the capacity factor is only
Table 8. Cost of making fly ash bricks
Percentage I Percentage II
Fly ash bricks cost differential (Rs. per 1000 bricks) 100 100
Volume per brick (cm3) 1795.4 1795.4
Density of brick (kg/m3) 1770 1770
Mass of 1000 bricks (kg) 3177.8 3177.8
Fly ash utilization in fly ash clay brick 0.25 0.25
Fly ash utilization in fly ash sand lime brick 0.6 0.6
Percentage of fly ash clay bricks as fraction of total fly ash-based bricks (assumed) 50 30
Percentage of fly ash sand lime brick (assumed) 50 70
Fly ash used in 1000 fly ash-based bricks (t) 1.35 1.57
Cost of fly ash utilization (Rs/t-flyash) 74.0 63.6
Transportation cost (Rs/km-t) 2 2
Assumed distance of transport to brick kiln (km) 50 50
Cost of fly ash utilization including transport costs (Rs/t) 174 163.6
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75 %, then nuclear power is cheaper than coal power only
for discount rates lower than 1.7 %.
The crossover point also varies with the assumed life-
times of the power plants. If one were to assume that the
economic lifetime of the coal plant is the same as that of
the nuclear plant, i.e., 40 years, the crossover point (at
80 % capacity factor) between Kaiga III and IV and RTPS
VII becomes 2.01 %, and that between Kaiga I and II and
RTPS VII becomes 2.06 %. As mentioned earlier, all of
these crossover points are unrealistically low values.
Therefore, for realistic values of discount rates, nuclear
power from the Kaiga reactors is more expensive than
electricity generated in RTPS VII.
8. Conclusions
Our primary goal in this paper was to calculate in detail,
dealing exhaustively with many of the sub-processes in-
volved and using updated data, the cost of producing elec-
tricity from the DAE’s pressurized heavy water reactors.
We have done so in a transparent manner laying out the
methodology and assumptions explicitly. This allows for
the possibility that it can be corrected, should better data
become available; given the limited amount of data pub-
licly available, this is quite likely.
Our analysis demonstrates that electricity from PHWRs
is more expensive for real discount rates above about 2-
3 %, under most reasonable assumptions. Such rates may
not be realistic over the decades that these plants are to
operate.
One criticism of this study has been that we have con-
sidered nuclear plants of smaller capacities, namely 220
MW, even though it is expected that electricity from larger
capacity nuclear plants would be cheaper. And therefore,
the argument goes, if one were to compare such larger
sized plants, then electricity from nuclear reactors would
be cheaper than electricity from similar sized coal-based
thermal power plants. There are two problems with this
argument. First, the experience of the last five decades of
nuclear power suggests that early predictions of costs are
frequently wrong. This is especially true in the case of
the DAE. In all the reactors constructed so far, final cost
figures have been higher than originally estimated[26].
Table 9. Figures used in calculations
Kaiga I & II Kaiga III & IV RTPS VII
Sum of annual construction costs[1] (Rs billion) 18.16 28.6688 4.913
Power plant capacity (MW) 440 440 210
In-plant consumption (%) 12 12 8.5
Economic lifetime (years) 40 40 30
Uranium fuel price (Rs/kg) 16,450 16,450
Initial uranium loading (t) 111.6 111.6
Fraction of initial fuel cost included in capital cost 0.5 0.5
Assumed burn-up (MWD/tU) 7,000 7,000
Uranium utilization (kg/kWh (gross)) 2.05 ´ 10-05 2.05 ´ 10-05
Heavy water price (Rs/kg) 24,880 24,880
Initial heavy water loading (t) 420 420
Heavy water losses (kg/year) 14,000 14,000
Transport of spent fuel (Rs/kg) 878 878
Decommissioning cost (as percentage of capital cost) 10 10
Coal cost (Rs/t) 1,412
Coal calorific content (MJ/kg) 14.7
Coal consumption (kg/kWh) 0.63
Coal ash fraction 40 %
Ash disposal cost (Rs/t) 174
Furnace oil consumption (ml/kWh) 2
Furnace oil cost (Rs/l) 18
O&M cost (percentage of capital cost) 2 2 2.5
Note
1. This is the sum of the actual expenditures incurred (or projected, in the case of Kaiga III & IV) and does not include interest during construction (IDC).
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Thus, without experience with actually constructed reac-
tors at lower prices, any claims about their cost should
be viewed with some scepticism.
Second, a fair comparison would also include the ef-
fects of cost-cutting measures at coal-based thermal
plants, including both capital cost reductions and fuel cost
reductions[27]. In this regard, RTPS VII can be counted as
an example of a plant that has reduced capital costs and
construction times successfully. However, this reduced
capital cost does not make the comparison of Kaiga nu-
clear plants with RTPS VII an unfair one because its dis-
tance from coal mines is somewhat large, thereby
increasing its fuel costs, which dominate the cost of pro-
ducing electricity at thermal plants.
A different shortcoming of this study is that it does not
take into account the costs imposed by both nuclear power
and coal-based thermal power on the environment and
public health. In particular, we have not imputed any eco-
nomic costs to the air pollution resulting from coal-based
thermal plants, though such pollution has gained in policy
relevance with the heightened concern about global warm-
ing. We do realize that both of the sources of power that
we have studied, and many others that we haven’t con-
sidered, do pollute the environment, with the impacts of
such pollution often being borne disproportionately by the
disempowered sections of society. Currently the ‘‘costs’’
of such impacts are not reflected in the economic costs
of these sources of power in India and elsewhere.
The inclusion of pollution costs is problematic, espe-
cially in the case of nuclear power. This is because the
Table 10. Levelised costs (in Rs/kWh) of different options for
discount rate of 1 %, capacity factor of 80 %, economic lifetime of
40 years for nuclear reactors, 30 years for thermal plant
Kaiga
I & II
Kaiga
III &
IV
RTPS
VII
(D)
Capacity cost (including O&M) (Rs/kWh) 0.65 0.67 0.27
Heavy water make-up cost (Rs/net kWh) 0.13 0.13 0
Fuel cost (Rs/net kWh) 0.38 0.38 1.01
Waste disposal cost (Rs/net kWh) 0.02 0.02 0.05
Total levelised cost (Rs/kWh) 1.18 1.20 1.33
Table 11. Total levelised costs (in Rs/kWh) of different options for
different discount rates, capacity factor of 80 %, economic lifetime
of 40 years for reactors, 30 years for thermal plant
Discount rate
(%)
Kaiga
I & II
Kaiga
III & IV
RTPS
VII
2 1.32 1.32 1.36
2.5 1.39 1.39 1.37
3 1.48 1.46 1.39
4 1.66 1.62 1.42
5 1.87 1.79 1.45
6 2.10 1.98 1.49
Figure 1. Levelized cost (Rs/kWh) vs. discount rate for Kaiga nuclear power plants and Raichur thermal plant VIIth stage
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pollution externalities for nuclear power are difficult to
quantify for many reasons. Two proximate ones are the
scientific and political controversies surrounding the
health impacts of low-level radiation and the lack of re-
liable data on radioactive emissions from nuclear facilities
and the impossibility of independent verification of the
scarce data available in the Indian context [Ramana and
Gadekar, 2003]. Finally, unlike carbon dioxide, which has
substantial sinks in the terrestrial and marine ecosystems,
there is no way to render radioactive materials benign.
Hence, the environmental and public health impacts of
long-lived radioactive wastes could occur well into the
future, possibly tens of thousands of years from now.
There are inherent problems with quantifying these. Thus,
it is all but impossible to impute a fair economic cost to
such environmental externalities.
Considering that electricity from the 220 MW Kaiga
plants is costlier than thermal power for a large range of
parameters, the conclusion that nuclear power is more ex-
pensive than thermal power from coal is robust. This con-
tradicts numerous claims by the DAE that nuclear power
is cheaper than coal-based thermal power at sites which
are 800-1000 km away from coal mines. Nuclear power
plants, therefore, have been and remain a costlier way of
trying to address India’s electricity needs than coal-based
thermal plants.
The DAE was set up with the promise of delivering
cheap nuclear electricity for development. Over the dec-
ades, it acquired a new rationale for its existence and con-
tinued funding, building nuclear weapons, and started
promising a new good -- security [Abraham, 1998; Perk-
ovich, 1999]. This second promise, again, has proven to
be a false one [Ramana and Reddy, 2003; Ramana and
Mian, 2003]. In the end it seems that atomic energy has
neither delivered energy nor security.
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Notes
1. This paper is a modified version of [Ramana et al., 2005] incorporating the suggestions
offered by the reviewer.
2. Two 540 MW reactors are due to become commercial soon, raising the total nuclear
capacity to 3,850 MW.
3. The summary of this study was published as [Nema, 1999]. When asked for a copy of
the full study, the NPC’s spokesperson told one of the authors (Ramana) that it was
not available to the public.
4. For comparison, the final (revised) budget for the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy
Sources, which is in charge of developing solar, wind, small hydro and biomass-based
power, in 2002-03 was Rs. 4.7356 billion. These sources between them comprise 4800
MW of generating capacity [MNES, 2004], as compared with the 2,770 MW of nuclear
power. Their contribution to actual electricity generation would, of course, be smaller
because they are intermittent sources of power.
5. Pressurised heavy water reactors use heavy water (in which the hydrogen atoms are
replaced by deuterium, a heavier isotope of hydrogen, with atomic weight 2).
6. This compares the economics of generating electricity from two different sources of
power. Transmission and distribution costs are external to the production process itself
and their inclusion would make the comparison dependent on the locations of the power
plant and the load centres.
7. The data is available on the Internet to subscribers at http://www.worldbank.org/
8. In other words, the comparison is for an investor who already has the required funds.
9. The DAE typically constructs two nuclear reactors at one time at each site. This is why
we treat the two reactors as one unit.
10. A nuclear plant is said to become critical when it starts sustaining a chain reaction.
There is usually a period reserved for safety checks and other operational matters
before the reactor actually starts supplying electricity to the grid.
11. This is in mixed year rupees, and cannot be directly compared with future reactors
whose costs are given in present day rupees.
12. The collapse is usually termed ‘‘delamination’’ in official documents [Mohan, 1994]. There
was also a less publicized fire on the same dome [Anon., 1999a].
13. For nuclear power cost increases in the case of the USA, see [Komanoff, 1981].
14. From the reported value of $ 20 million for the 100 t of heavy water exported, it would
seem that the heavy water was probably sold below cost of production.
15. Elsewhere the savings have been quoted as being Rs. 1 billion [Anon., 2001].
16. The article itself mentions a price of ‘‘about Rs. 25 lakhs’’ (Rs. 2.5 million) for a fuel
assembly. However, this appears to be a misprint or an error. When asked for clarifi-
cation, the author confirmed that the engineers at the Nuclear Fuel Complex had actually
mentioned a price of Rs. 250,000 [Subramanian, 2002a].
17. This is sometimes called working capital.
18. See the discussion in [Bunn et al., 2003].
19. In the case of the leak at Narora-II on 15 April 2000, one worker received an internal
dose of 47.12 mSv, well in excess of the 30 mSv annual limit on radiation doses to
workers.
20. For an estimate of the quantities involved see [Ramana et al., 2001].
21. Like most of the DAE’s nuclear power stations, the Kaiga nuclear reactors do not have
a reprocessing plant on-site. Therefore, if its spent fuel is to be reprocessed, it must
be shipped to either Tarapur (near Mumbai) or Kalpakkam (near Chennai).
22. Expenses after that are considered part of O&M expenses.
23. We are being somewhat unfavourable to the cost of coal power since the kind of infe-
rior-grade coal that we have assumed for RTPS is available from points closer to
Raichur.
24. In the case of uranium, however, one would expect to see an increase in the price over
and above inflation in the not-too-distant future because of diminishing domestic re-
serves. We ignore this increase in order to be favourable to nuclear power in our
calculations.
25. For an estimate see [Bhattacharjee and Kandpal, 2002b].
26. Even in the case of the 540 MW reactors coming up at Tarapur, the initial cost estimate
was only Rs. 24.2751 billion. The final cost estimate is of the order of Rs. 60 billion.
27. One way to lower fuel costs would be through coal-washing, which decreases ash
content, which in turn reduces transportation costs and increases plant efficiencies.
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International Energy Initiative and its mission
Energy is of critical importance to development, economic growth, balance of payments, peace, national and regional
environmental protection and the global climate. The efficient production and use of energy in an environmentally sound
way is essential to tackling these concerns and defining a path to sustainable development based on equity, empowerment
(self-reliance), environmental harmony and economic efficiency.
Since no international institution had as its sole objective the promotion of the efficient production and use of energy, a
new International Energy Initiative (IEI) was established in September 1991. IEI is a small, independent, international,
non-governmental, public-purpose organization. It is a South-North partnership, Southern-conceived, led and located. It
networks with those concerned with energy. IEI’s mission is Information, Training, Analysis, Advocacy and Action (INTAAACT)
and the systems integration of these components. IEI’s objective is to promote -- initiate, strengthen and advance -- the
efficient production and use of energy for sustainable development.
IEI’s strategy is:
focusing on developing countries;
disseminating the new approach to energy, in which the level of energy services is taken as the measure of development,
rather than the magnitude of energy consumption and supply; 
increasing energy services through a rationally determined mix of ‘‘hardware’’ -- ‘‘cleaner’’ centralized/decentralized sources
of energy and end-use efficiency measures;
addressing the ‘‘software’’ issues -- policies, institutions, financing, and management involved in the implementation of
such a "hardware" mix;
providing rigorous assessments and promoting the dissemination of emerging technologies of end-use efficiency improve-
ment and of decentralized renewable sources (including modern biomass-based technologies);
initiating and strengthening technological capability in energy analysis, planning and implementation in developing coun-
tries; and
promoting the improvement of existing energy institutions and efforts and the design of new ones.
Find out more about IEI on the Internet at www.ieiglobal.org.
 Energy for Sustainable Development l Volume IX No. 2 l June 2005
Articles
48
